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A quantitative study of the American machine tool industry in the latter
half of the nineteenth century faces a data problem of formidable propor-
tions.This results not only from the lack of statistical information,
common to many areas of research of that period, but primarily from the
fact that it was not until the end of the period that a distinct machine
tool industry emerged in the sense ofgroup of firms whose principal
product was machine tools.Until about 1900, the machine tool in-
dustry could not be called a large, independent sector of the economy
like many of the other groups of companies that led in American
industrialization.
A reading of the classic work by Roe on the early American machine
tool manufacturers gives the opposite impression.1 A whole chapter is
devoted to Joseph Brown and the Brown and Sharpe Manufacturing
Company of Providence, Rhode Island, as one of the leading New England
machine tool companies. Founded on the invention of the universal
milling machine and the precision devices invented and produced by
Brown, Brown and Sharpe was undoubtedly a leading company. On the
other hand, examination of the financial records of the company reveals
that the value of its output of sewing machines, manufactured under
license from Wilcox and Gibbs, exceeded the value of machine tool
shipments until 1885, twenty-five years after the invention of the universal
milling machine. The year 1898 was the first in which the value of machine
tool shipments accounted for more than 50 per cent of the total sales of
Brown and Sharpe and, although that percentage was approached in
Nom: The author wishes to acknowledge financial assistance from the Ford Foun-
dation, the Interuniversity Committee on American Economic History, and Purdue
University; the cooperation of many persons in the machine tool industry; and the
assistance of George A. Wing and Arvid M. Zarley; all of whom contributed greatly
to this paper, but none of whom are responsible for the conclusions, opinions, or
statements contained herein. That responsibility remains the author's alone.
'J. W. Roe, English and American Tool Builders, New Haven, 1916.498 POWER AND MACHINES
subsequent years, it was not reached again before 1904 when the data end
(Table A-I).2
A further indication of the relatively small and unspecialized nature of
the industry is the fact that the National Machine Tool Builders Associa-
tion was founded by seventeen firms as late as 1902, and the Association
has published no industry data for the period before 1900.Finally, it
was not until the 1914 Census of Manufactures that the federal government
published separate data for industrial machinery output, including machine
tools, but the report is far from complete. The earlier decennial Census
reports on manufacturing have a section listed as machinery, but machine
tools are not treated separately. The sector as reported includes such things
as agricultural implements, sewing machines (including presumably the
total output of Brown and Sharpe until at least the Census of 1880),
pumps, engines, professional and scientific instruments, and an omnibus
category of foundry and machine shop products, n.e.s.—by far the largest
category of all.
This paper deals only with metal-cutting machines and includes no
information on metal-forming types. A lathe or milling machine would
be an example of the first type, a press 'or hammer would be an example
of the second.Furthermore, the paper deals with general-purpose
standard machines of the light variety. Neither machines made on special
order for a particular job nor industry-specialized machines such as
textile or mining machinery are included. The machines considered here
are the versatile, primary machines used in the production of other
machinery as well as in the production of such goods as sewing machines
and typewriters, not generally considered to be machines. It has proved
impossible to quantify the size of the special-order output of machine
tools in the nineteenth century. Manufacture of such tools was apparently
concentrated in Philadelphia, particularly in the William Sellers Company
and in the group of firms eventually combined as the Niles-Bement-Pond
Company.3 All attempts to uncover any records of the early Philadelphia
companies met with failure.
The period covered in this paper is 1861-1910. The beginning date was
chosen because no reliable quantitative data were found for any earlier
years. Hubbard, in a series of articles in the American Machinist about
the early beginnings of machine tool manufacture in New England, lists
an impressive number of persons and companies involved in machine
2Thereis, of course, a difference between sales andshipments,but the relative im-
portance of machine tools in total sales is nonetheless represented accurately.
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tool design and production before Yet the impression gained is
of a series of small undertakings to meet specific needs, such as government
musket contracts, or construction of special machinery to meet individual
industry demands. For example, a mechanic in a textile mill or a small
shop might build a lathe for his own use, but there is no evidence in
Hubbard's work that there were machine tool companies as such. Roe,
although more concerned with technical developments in machine tool
design than with quantitative measures of the industry, uses 1850 as the
beginning date of the American machine tool industry. As subsidiary
evidence, it might be noted that none of the charter companies of the
National Machine Tool Builders Association existed in 1860, as far as
can be determined from the various regional genealogies of the industry.
The primary source of the data used in the paper is company records.
The best records, and the only ones for 1861—81, were obtained from the
Brown and Sharpe Company for 1861—1905. The records list a total of
23,658 machine tools shipped by the company from September 1861 to
June Each shipment is recorded by type and size of machine,
date of shipment, name and location of consignee, and price. Year-end
financial statements of the same company were also obtained for 1869—
1905. A second shipment series was obtained from the Bullard Company
of Bridgeport, Connecticut, covering a total of 6,535 machines shipped
between April 1881 and December 1912. Those records did not include
price, but a separate price record found for 1895—1912 made possible
calculation of dollar sales for the shorter period. Sales figures have also
been obtained for the G. A. Gray Company, Cincinnati, for 1886—1910,
and for the Cincinnati Shaper Company for 1899—1910. A 20 per cent
sample of the shipment records of the two Cincinnati companies showing
region of destination, by various time periods, is also available.6 Finally,
a series of the dollar value of new orders was obtained from the Warner
and Swasey Company of Cleveland for 1880—1910, and a series of sales
figures from the same company beginning in 1903. A total of twenty-one
existing machine tool companies with roots extending back into the
nineteenth century were communicated with in the study.All requests
were met with offers of assistance, but all except the above-mentioned
'G. Hubbard, "Development of Machine Tools in New England," American
Machinist, Vols. 59 and 60, 1923 and 1924.
Shipments differ from production by the number of machines produced but
retained for the company's use and by the net change in machine inventory. Data for
shipments only were available.
6Theinformation on the Cincinnati companies was made available to the author
through the kindness of George A. Wing.500 POWER AND MACHINES
few reported that early records had been destroyed, frequently as a result
of consolidation or reorganization of firms.7
The subsequent analysis in this paper is based, therefore, on the records
of a relatively small number of firms. There is no way of telling how
representative of the industry the sample is. We do know that Brown and
Sharpe was an early technical leader in the machine tool field and one of
the leading producers of light machine tools in New England. The Brown
and Sharpe Company began in 1853 when Lucien Sharpe, who proved
to be the businessman of the combination, was brought into the company
formed in 1833 by David and Joseph R. Brown, father and son, to make
and repair clocks. In 1850 Joseph Brown developed the first automatic
linear dividing engine for graduating rules, a machine Roe mentions as
still being in use in the shop in 1916. The next efforts were production
of protractors and calipers with the vernier scale attached. Standards and
accuracy of measurement continued to be an important concern of the
firm—as they still are today—but, from the point of view of this paper,
the developments must be considered peripheral to the main subject. The
first machine tool produced for sale by the company was a turret screw
machine of a general design well known at the time, sold in 1861 to the
Providence Tool Company which had a contract to manufacture Spring-
field muskets for the government. Joseph Brown's significant contribution
to machine tool design came in 1861-62, when he invented the universal
milling machine. The first of these new machines was shipped in 1862,
again to the Providence Tool Company.
Throughout the period covered by the available records, Brown and
Sharpe concentrated on the production of light, standard machine tools,
screw machines, grinding machines, and the universal milling machine.
In this respect, it was apparently similar to Pratt and Whitney, whose
product line was much the same in nature although more extensive in
both kind and number of machines produced. Brown and Sharpe is
therefore probably a good sample of the light machine tool operations in
New England as a whole.
The Bridgeport Machine Tool Company, which was to become the
Bullard Company, was established in 1880 as a producer of machine tools
in Bridgeport, Connecticut, by E. P. Bullard. Bullard was a mechanic
who had become a machine tool agent in New York City and, from his
experience in selling tools, he recognized the need for a more accurate
'The greatest disappointment in this project was the discovery that the first volume
of the shipment records of the Pratt and Whitney Company of West Hartford, Connecti-
cut, covering the period up to about 1904 had been destroyed eighteen months before
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engine lathe than those currently available. He engaged a mechanic to
produce the lathes in Bridgeport but, within a year, had taken full control
of the operation. The first shipment of the new company was a total of
twenty-five 16-foot by 5-inch engine lathes between April and June 1881,
consigned to the Westinghouse Airbrake Company of Pittsburgh. In 1883,
Bullard made a significant contribution to the technical progress of the
machine tool art with the invention of a small boring mill capable of
accurate production work. The new machine was publicized for the first
time in 1883, but no shipments were made until 1885. With the movement
into the boring mill and the larger engine lathe, the Bullard Company
developed a product line of machines that were larger, as measured by
average price per machine, than those developed by Brown and Sharpe.
There is no way of assessing the representativeness of the sample
collected.The records of Brown and Sharpe are extremely valuable
because it is fairly certain it was quantitatively a large firm and was
certainly a leader in the technology of the light machine tool field. Bullard
is also a valuable sample because, while not quantitatively so large a firm
as Brown and Sharpe, its output encompassed the larger type of production
machine tool. The evidence available for the Ohio companies is only
meager and, while implications can be drawn from the information
available, it will not support much analysis.
Little more can be said beyond affirming that the information gathered
for this paper exceeds anything previously available, and that an effort
has been made to track down as much relevant material as possible.
What follows, therefore, while strictly speaking a quantitative study of
selected firms, represents the growth pattern of the American type of
production cutting machine tool through the first decade of this century.
Growth of Output
The literature on the history of the American machine tool industry
never fails to point to the supreme importance of the machine tool in the
development of what came to be called the American system of manu-
facture. There can be no doubt that mass production, the standardization
of parts, and precision manufacturing all stemmed from advancing
technology embodied in machine tools. What seems clear from the record,
however, is that these accouterments of an industrial society came at a
fairly late stage in the process of development and were associated with a
particular change in output mix.
Perhaps the most impressive aspect of the quantitative records available
is that the volume of shipments was so small (Table A-2). The first502 POWER AND MACHINES
machine tool was shipped by Brown and Sharpe in 1861.It was not,
however, until 1875 that the cumulative total of machines shipped passed
the 1,000 mark, and not until 1883 that it reached 2,000.Between
September 1861 and June 1905, the records show that Brown and Sharpe
shipped a total of 23,658 machine tools, but 12,447 of the total number,
or 52.6 per cent, were shipped between January 1899 and June 1905. The
Bullard Company began shipping machines in April 1881, but it was
not until 1890 that the cumulative number of shipments passed the 1,000
mark. Up to the end of 1910, Bullard shipped a total of 6,162 machines,
but 3,229 of the total number, or 52.4 per cent, were shipped between
January 1901 and December 1910.
There is ample evidence that the acceleration in the rate of growth of
commodity output which marked the initial period of industrial develop-
ment in the United States began before the Civil War. Whether or not
one wishes to call it the period of "take-off," following Rostow, it is clear
from Gailman's figures that the high decade rates of growth shown for
the period just before 1860 must have marked a sharp change from the
rates existing in the early decades of the nineteenth century.8 Galiman's
figures also show evidence of a decline in the growth rates of commodity
output, and particularly in the growth rate of value added by manu-
facturing, in the latter decades of the nineteenth century. As Galiman
pointed out, his results are roughly consistent with the trend-cycle dating
determined by Burns from his study of production trends, which shows
a period of rapid increase of nonagricultural industrial output between
1875 and 1885 and again between 1895 and
1presents rates of change calculated from the available long-term
records of machine tool output along with selected rates of change
derived from Gailman. The Gailman rates of change are based on single-
year figures, while those for the machine tool shipments are three-year
averages centered on the years available to Gallman.Presumably,
therefore, the Gailman figures would show the influence of business
cycles more sharply than the shipment figures do, but the differences are
so clear that the conclusions drawn from the table are unlikely to be
affected by cyclical variations in the underlying figures.
The conclusion derived from the table is that the light production
machine tool was not quantitatively important in the period of American
industrialization but became important at a later period. This conclusion
8R.E. Galiman, "Commodity Output, 1839—1 899," Trends in the American Economy
in the Nineteenth Century, Studies in Income and Wealth 23, Princeton for NBER,
1960, pp. 15—17.
A. F. Burns, Production Trends in the United States since 1870, New York, NBER,
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couldresult from the fact that only one company is considered. The
explanation of the difference in the aggregate and single-company growth
figures could merely reflect a sudden increase in the prominence of Brown
and Sharpe, or a technical development that permitted a sharp increase
in the output of the firm. Both explanations appear unlikely. Brown and
Sharpe had a wide reputation as a machine tool producer, if its exhibition
of tools at international expositions as early as 1869 is any indication.'0
Also, the second hypothesis seems unlikely in view of the fact that the
company's product line, which represented inputs to its own productive
process, shows no apparent marked technical change over time.
TABLE I
RATESOF Cl-lANGEI N MAO-I INE TOOL PRICES P44DUT UT,
SELECTED VARIABLES, DECENNIAL OR QUINQUEMNIAL,
(percent)
Change Value Change in Number of






















1879 82 67 25 35 —12
1884 90 50 121 67
1889 112 117 376 300 654
1894 71 229 201 400
1899 51 48 221 170 320
Source:Col. 1 from Gailman, "Commodity Output," Table 3,p.24;
col. 2 calculated from ibid., Table A—12, p. 65; cols. 3—5 from company
records.
Themore likely explanation is found in the relation between machine
tool output and the industrial destination of the machines, which can be
inferred from the major product of the buyer. The name of the buyer
•does not always appear in the available records showing the consignee of
shipments. Where the consignee was an agent and only the agent's name
was listed, it was impossible to determine the eventual destination of the
machine. In other records, the name of the consignee gave no clue to
the industry to which it belonged, although in some such cases the firm
could be allocated by reference to other sources. Of a total of 22,478
machines shipped by Brown and Sharpe to December 1904, 8,499 or
Brown and Sharpe published a catalogue in French in August 1867, and one in
German in April 1868.504 POWERAND MACHINES
37.8 per cent were consigned to domestic and foreign agents or allocated
to unknown buyers.Of this number, 4,469 or more than half were
consigned to foreign agents. Of the total of 6,162 machines shipped by
Bullard to December 1910, 2,498 or 40.5 per cent were consigned to
domestic and foreign agents or allocated to unknown buyers. Of this
number, 1,284 or more than half were consigned to foreign agents. The
problem of the agent comes up again with respect to machine tool com-
panies as consignees. We know, for example, that Pratt and Whitney
established agencies in many parts of the United States fairly early in its
history, and acted as agents for Brown and Sharpe as well. The very
minor number of machines consigned to Pratt and Whitney indicates
that, in spite of the affiliation, final consignee was specified on sales through
the agent. There is no way of telling, however, how many local machine
shops, especially those begun by Brown and Sharpe apprentices, might
have acted as agents.
Table 2 presents quinquennial totals of part of the industrial distribution
of shipments by Brown and Sharpe and by Bullard.There are two
significant points, shown by the table. The first is the clear association
between the expanding output of machine tools and the growth of indus-
tries producing fairly complex and technically sophisticated final products.
The bicycle, the cash register, and the electrical equipment industries, and
government arsenals all placed substantial orders for machines after 1885.
Second, the difference in the relative size of the machines in the Brown
and Sharpe and Bullard product lines shows up in the table.Bullard
shipped no machines to companies producing cash registers between 1881
and 1910, only eighteen machines to sewing machine companies, and only
seven machines to bicycle companies. On the other hand, the percentage
of total Bullard shipments consigned to iron foundries and iron and
steel mills was six times the corresponding percentage for Brown and
Sharpe. Sales by the two companies to automobile producers show an
interesting difference. Bullard shipped its first machine to an automobile
company in 1901 by which time Brown and Sharpe had shipped 101
machines but, as the automobile increased in size and complexity, heavy
tools became more important as inputs, and shipments by Bullard
increased markedly.
A machine tool of the type considered here is a fairly versatile input.
It is true that the machines produced before 1910 were specific in the types
of operations they could perform; an engine lathe, for example, was
quite limited in the kinds of operations it could be set up to accomplish
at one time, but these machines could be used to produce many different
products. The reasonable conclusion seems to be that, until after 1884MACHINE TOOL OUTPUT, 1861—1910 505
TABLE 2
























A •SOLDBYBROWN AND SHARPE
Machine tools 16 22 16 8 63 .90 194 439 649
Rifles and
ammunition 100 11 41 10 9 62 85 259
Sewing and
shoe machines22 62 135 35 120 88 93 140 253
Calculatorsand
cash registers0 0 0 0 9 13 101 183 716
Professional and
scientific in—
struinentsC 0 10 6 9 35 30 65 144 282
Cove rninent
arsenals 3 14 14 1 6 379 113 409 601
Electric equip-
ment 0 0 0 3 60 49
.157 538 797
Bicycles 0 0 0 0 0 27 32 267 78
Automobiles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 268
Railroads and
R.R.equip-




chinesd 95.4 80.068.561,1 71.3 67.8 58.2 63.3 65.4
B.SOLD BY BULLARD
tools 36 87 99 66 101 91
Railroads and
R.R. equip-
ment 112 65 104 77 207 212
Iron andsteel 3 31 85 81 65 91
Electric equip-
ment 4 53 54 52 192 167
Government
arsenals 1 10 49 31 24 17
Bicycles 0 0 0 0 5 2
Automobiles 0 0 0 0 19 88
Sum of cols. as
per cent of
total ma—
chjnesd 76.1 70.3 68.2 74.2 71.9 65.6
Source: Company records.
8September 1861 cc December 1864, Brown and Sharpe.
.bAprji 1881to December 1884, Bullard.
CIncludea companies makingwatches,clocks, cameras, optical equipment,
anddentalequipment.
dTheaeare columntotalsas a percentage of the total number of machines
that could be allocated by user.506 POWER AND MACHINES
or more noticeably after 1895, the demand for light machine tools was
relatively limited. The large demand for machine tools beginning at the
turn of the century can be associated with the development of a new
technology, and with the beginnings of what Rostow has called the period
of "high mass consumption."
Market for Machine Tools
While the volume of shipments from machine tool companies was appar-
ently quite modest until nearly the end of the nineteenth century, the
market was anything but local. During the Civil War the market was
dominated by domestic demands from armament makers.Between
September 1861 and the end of 1864, Brown and Sharpe shipped a total
of 201 machines, 100 of them to armament makers in New England.
As soon as the war demand ended, the market area expanded considerably.
The first shipments by Brown and Sharpe to foreign customers were made
in 1865, when two machines were shipped to Canada and two to France.
From 1865 on, the foreign market accounted for a significant proportion
of Brown and Sharpe shipments, never accounting for less than 10 per cent
of the total in any one year, and in some years rising to over 50 per cent.
For the Bullard Company, foreign shipments were not as significant a
proportion of the total until after 1896 but, of the ninety machines shipped
in the first year, 1881, two were consigned to foreign customers. In the
fifteen years between 1881 and 1895, there were only five years when no
foreign shipments were made, and a total of thirty-seven machines were
shipped abroad. In 1896, 25.9 per cent of the machines shipped went to
foreign buyers, and in the four years 1897—1900 the proportion was
between 50 and 60 per cent.In the decade 1901—10 an average of 23
per cent of Bullard shipments was consigned to foreign customers
(Table A-3).
A sample of the shipments of the two Cincinnati companies shows that
the New England toolmakers did not monopolize the foreign trade. A
20 per cent sample of the shipments by the G. A. Gray Company between
1884 and 1907 (sample size, 799 machines) shows 165 machines, or 20.8
per cent of the total, consigned to foreign customers. The same type of
sample taken from the records of the Cincinnati Shaper Company between
1899 and 1907 (sample size, 554 machines) shows that 110 machines, or
19.9 per cent of the total, were shipped abroad. Finally the sales records
of the Warner and Swasey Company of Cleveland show an averageMACHINE TOOL OUTPUT, 1861—1910 507
share of foreign in total sales of 18.8 per cent between 1903 and 1910.
As one would expect, northwest Europe dominated the foreign market.
The number of machines shipped by Brown and Sharpe and by Bullard
to foreign regions, by quinquennia, is shown in Table 3. On the reasonable
TABLE3














0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0
1865—69 27 3 1 16 0 0 0 0
1870—74 60 10 5 34 0 0 0 0
1875—79 55 0 0 5 3 0 0 0
1880—84 84 0 2 29 7 1 2 0
1885—89 633 0 2 13 5 2 0 0
1890—94 431 6 38 25 8 7 0 7
1895—99 2,560 43 257 39 16 7 16 2




totals 82.9 1.5 5.8 4.0 0.8 0.2 47 0.2
B.BULLARD
1881_84d
7 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
1885—89 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1890—94 7 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
1895—99 446 0 8 2 1 0 0 0
1900—04 394 3 1 30 1 0 2 0
1905—09 341 20 9 29 4 1 9 0
Percentage
di St ri— .
bution of
totals 90.6 1.7 1.3 4.9 0.5 0.0 1.2 0.0
Source:Company records.
5Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey.
bPoland, Rumania, Bulgaria.
C5
1861 to Dec. 1864.
dA 1881 to Dec. 1884.
assumptionthat foreign companies purchasing American machine tools
were not tied to particular American producers, this table can be taken
as representative of the regional distribution of foreign shipments by the
American machine tool industry as a whole. There are differences between
the two panels of the table.The Brown and Sharpe figures show a
smaller proportion of total foreign shipments to northwest Europe and a
larger proportion to Russia (including eastern Europe) and Asia than the508 POWER AND MACHINES
Bullard figures do. The differences are accounted for by relatively large
shipments by Brown and Sharpe to government arsenals in Russia
between 1895 and 1901 (over 300 machines) and to Japanese government
arsenals and shipyards in 1904 (260 machines). Since the Bullard line of
products was not suitable for armaments manufacture at that time, the
company did not share the market.
That northwest Europe was the major foreign market for shipments is,
of course, not surprising. Nor is the distribution by country of destination
within Europe. Table 4 presents the distribution of shipments to northwest
TABLE4











1865—69 4 12 4 0 0 0
1870—74 28 1 17 13 0 1
1875—79 23 20 11 0 1 0
1880—84 56 7 20 1 0 0
1885—89 181 352 67 23 3 7
•1890—94 182 60 92 47 14 36
1895—99 975 511 621 243 80 130
1900—04 1,106 587 323 121 77 135
Source:Company records.
Europe,by country of destination, for Brown and Sharpe only.'1 The
United Kingdom was clearly the largest single purchaser of machines
from Brown and Sharpe, not only in total but also in all subperiods
except 1865—69 and 1885—89. The large volume of shipments to France
in the latter quinquennium is made up primarily of shipments to French
government arsenals, which received nearly 200 machines between 1886
and 1888.
In the total number of machines shipped, France was the second largest
customer and Germany the third largest. Most, although not all, of the
difference is accounted for by the large shipment to French arsenals noted
above. The time distribution of machines to other regions generally
coincides with what is known about their periods of industrialization.
11InTables 3 and 4, the distribution was derived from records that generally list
only one consignee. Thus, a London or Antwerp agent might subsequently ship a
machine consigned to him to another region or country. In view of the number of
agents scattered throughout Europe, this possibility is unlikely to affect the distribution
appreciably.MACHINE TOOL OUTPUT, 1861—1910 509
Expectably,the destination of the machine shipments moved across
Europe in general conformity with the eastward progress of the industrial
revolution.
The same sort of geographic distribution of machine shipments based
on the level of industrial activity in a region is evident in Table 5,where
TABLE5
























112 81 3 0 5 0 0 0 0
1865—69 95 122 15 0 5 0 0 0 2
1870—74 161 208 20 2 0 2 1 0 4
1875—79 69 90 35 4 2 0 0 0 8
1880—84 272 419 138 17 24 4 2 0 9
1885—89 396 491 221 26 52 8 6 3 7
1890—94 699 784 373 26 90 18 3 4 10
1895—99 1,252 1,270 853 35 93 23 7 10 23




totals 32.6 37.9 22.4 1.7 3.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 1.0
B.BULLARD
90 214 20 0 3 0 3 0 0
1885—89 206 276 85 0 14 1 1 0 1
1890—94 173 351 37 0 0 0 1 3
1895—99 126 296 14 4 49 0 0 0 47
1900—04 188 521 241 20 69 8 11 4 25




totals 22.1 48.3 18.3 1.3 6.3 0.6 0.4 0.2 2.4
Source:Company records.
1861 to December 1864.
bAil 1881to December 1884.
CBetweefl 1890 and 1892, 46 machines were shipped to the Navy Department in the
District of Columbia.
thedistribution of shipments to United States regions (Census definition)
is given for Brown and Sharpe and for Bullard. The dominant position
of the middle Atlantic region is clear from the table. In all but the first
subperiod 1861—64, that region received' more machines than any other
from both companies. The New England and east north central regions
received some machines in all subperiods, and while neither was as510 POWER AND MACHINES
quantitatively important as the middle Atlantic region, the inference
certainly is that the domestic market for the tools of these New England
companies was widespread. The transportation costs—probably fairly
substantial, at least in the early period—did not limit Brown and Sharpe
to a local market.
That transportation cost was not a strong deterrent is shown most
strikingly by the increase in the volume of shipments to the east north
central region after 1880. As Roe has pointed out, "prior to 1880 prac-
tically all of the tool building in the United States was done east of the
Alleghenies," but that "good tool building appeared in Ohio in the early
eighties, and within the ten years its competition was felt by eastern tool
builders." 12Itis clear, however, that growth of manufacturing and of a
machine tool industry in the Ohio Valley had only good effects upon the
New England companies. Increased industrial activity meant increased
machine tool inputs, and New England production machine tools were
among the best available.
The table does indicate that, whereas from the subperiod 1885—89 on
Brown and Sharpe shipped machines to all regions, Bullard did not
consistently ship to all regions until the period 1900—04. That the difference
resulted from the higher transportation costs incurred by the larger and
heavier Bullard machines is unlikely. The more likely explanation is that
the heavier production machine is not required as an input until a region
reaches a certain threshold of industrial sophistication.
The information available from the Cincinnati firms shows that they
also enjoyed a wide geographic market for their output. The 20 per cent
sample of the shipments of G. A. Gray Company for the period 1884—1907
contains 631 domestic shipments. The percentage distribution of the
destination of the shipments shows that 8.2 per cent went to New England,
26.9 per cent to the East,13 53.2 per cent to the north central region,14
4.6 per cent to the South, and 7.0 per cent to the West. The percentage
distribution of the 444 domestic machine shipments in the 20 per cent
sample of the Cincinnati Shaper Company between 1899 and 1907 shows
that 5.2 per cent went to New England, 45.7 per cent to the East, 26.8
per cent to the north central region, 10.4 per cent to the South, and 11.9
per cent to the West.It appears from these figures that Roe's statement
that the Ohio companies competed with the New England firms was
correct.It is also true that such competition, carried on in a rapidly
expanding market, had beneficial effects on the firms in both regions.
12Roe,English and American, p. 261.
Definedas New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware.
14Definedas Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota.MACHINE TOOL OUTPUT, 1861—1910 511
The relative size of the firms in both regions should be noted. Roe
mentions that the Gray Company started in 1883 to build lathes, but soon
specialized on planers and "is now [1916] one of the foremost firms in the
country specializing in this type of tool."Yetthe 20 per cent sample
taken from Gray's shipment records shows a sample size of only 987
machines shipped between 1884 and 1915, 767 of which were domestic
shipments.
Feast or Famine Industry
Discussions of the machine tool industry mention in some form or other
the fact that fluctuations in output of the industry tend to be much wider
than fluctuations in general industrial output or in the index of economic
activity.It might be argued, however, that this characteristic of the
machine tool industry is part of a well-known phenomenon of an industrial
economy which has acquired and is using a large stock of producer
durable equipment.During a period of industrialization,sufficient
momentum might be generated by new, rapidly growing industries so that
the output of machine tools is little affected by fluctuations in general
commodity output.
Whatever the theoretical merits of such a hypothesis, it is clear from the
available records of machine tool output and sales (Table A-2) that the
firms were subject to substantial fluctuations in demand. Unfortunately,
the National Bureau reference cycle chronology does not give measures
of the severity of cycles for the period under review here, and it is impossible
therefore to say whether machine tool demand fluctuated more widely
than aggregate demand.
Comparison of the National Bureau reference cycle chronology with
the measures of machine tool output shows three periods of noncon-
.forrnity.16 The reference cycle peak of 1869 and trough of 1870, the peak
of 1887 and trough of 1888, and the peak of 1895 and trough of 1896
are not reflected clearly in the output measures. For the first period,
1869-70, only the output series for Brown and Sharpe is available, and
so perhaps no great importance should be attached to the nonconformity.
For the second period, 1887-88, four series are available and only the
new-orders series of Warner and Swasey shows a contraction. For the
third period, 1895-96, four series are available and only the Gray Company
sales series shows a contraction. Both 1886—90 and 1895—99 were periods
Roe, English and American, p. 273.
A. F. Burns and W. C. Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycles, New York, NOER,
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of substantial increase in the level of machine tool output. The noncon-
formity with reference cycle dating might then serve as evidence that,
during periods of vigorous demand associated perhaps with rapid technical
change, the output of machine tools is unaffected by cyclical contractions
in aggregate demand.
The evidence almost disappears, however, when the output series are
separated into domestic and foreign shipments, which is possible with
the Brown and Sharpe and the Bullard data (Table A-3). There is no
contraction in the Brown and Sharpe domestic shipment series in 1869-70,
or in the Bullard domestic shipment series in 1887-88. But there is a clear
contraction in the Brown and Sharpe domestic shipment series in 1887-88,
and the domestic shipment series of both companies show a contraction
after 1895, Bullard in 1897, and Brown and Sharpe in 1896-97.
The differences in the cyclical behavior of the total and domestic ship-
ment series is perhaps to be expected from the differences in the reference
cycle dates in the United States, France, Great Britain, and Germany.
There is very little evidence of an inverse cycle in domestic and foreign
shipments, but the foreign shipments of Brown and Sharpe reached a
peak in 1888, and there was a strong foreign demand for both Brown and
Sharpe and Bullard output between 189.5 and 1901 which submerged the
domestic contraction of 1895-96.
Summary
The data collected for this paper are undoubtedly far from satisfactory
as a basis for an analysis of the nineteenth century machine tool industry,
but company records are the only source from which a quantitative
record of the industry can be established.
The data assembled suggest that the demand for light, metal-cutting
machine tools was relatively small during the initial period of industrializa-
tion, when technical development was embodied in fairly large and crude
systems. Sewing machine manufacturers were a steady component of the
demand for Brown and Sharpe machines back to 1861.It was not until
the 1890's, however, that manufacturers of electrical equipment, calcu-
lators, cash registers, and bicycles provided a rapidly expanding market
for light tools.
The data also show that the American machine tool industry enjoyed
a truly worldwide market during the nineteenth century. Much has been
written about the technical superiority of the American machines during
the period, and certainly the records indicate that quality was recognized
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For this particular industry, 1910—the end date of the analysis here—
is significant because it can serve as a dividing line in the history of machine
tools. After 1910, the assembly line called for more specialized and special-
order machines than before, and faster cutting speeds and heavier machines
were in demand. The automobile industry alone created a revolution in
machine tool building.
Appendix
In addition to background data for the text tables, the appendix presents
some additional information collected from machine tool companies
during the study but not used directly in the earlier pages.
Table A-i presents information relating to Brown and Sharpe only.
The figures on total sales were taken from annual financial statements,
while the amount of sewing machine work and "other work done" came
from other records. The same basic data must have been used in both
records, because the breakdown of the sales figures adds to total sales.
Other work done is not further specified, but it must have included
machine tool sales and probably also repair work and miscellaneous
products.The shipment records mention production of core ovens,
foundry rattlers, and soda kettles, which would serve to utilize the foundry
facilities of the company. Also noted are grindstones and grindstone
troughs which would be the forerunners of the grinding machines, an
important part of machinery shipments after the late 1870's. Between
1873 and 1881, the company produced 199 cylindrical sewing machines
or seamers with an aggregate value of $26,891 that were shipped to
domestic and British print works and bleacheries. No description of this
machine was found, but the name suggests that Brown and Sharpe's
experience in sewing machine production enabled it to produce the
machine as a stopgap measure during the depression following 1873.
The profit series in Table A-i is taken from a set of financial statements
found in the company's files. The statements apparently were put together
as a hybrid balance sheet and income statement for the information of the
owners of the business to show the position of the firm on January 1 of
each year. They were probably used by the owners to determine the
total dividends to be paid each year.
To arrive at the profit figure, a figure of capital value on January 1
was first derived. Capital value was computed as the sum of cash, notes,
accounts, value of land, plant, and equipment, and what was called
"stock," which may or may not include the inventory of finished and
unfinished .goods. The profit during the year (column 6) was derived by
taking the difference between two successive capital values, adding the514 POWER AND MACHINES
dividends taken out during the year, and subtracting the amount received
from Darling, Brown, and Sharpe, the precision instrument subsidiary
until 1893 when Darling's share was purchased by the parent company.
Causes of the fluctuations in what is called profits could not be determined
by examination of the records. The substantial figures for the period
1869—73 appear to be largely the result of an upward valuation of the
land, buildings, and tools owned by the company, and the losses of 1874
and 1875 of a downward revaluation of buildings and fixtures.
The financial statements are clearly unacceptable in terms of good
accounting practice. Business decisions probably were made in part on
the basis of them, however, and on that ground the profit series is relevant
information. That other factors also influenced decisions is clear from
the lack of correspondence between the dividend series and the profit
series. Dividends do not move in the same direction as profits in as many
as half of the years shown.TABLE A—i











Year Sales Work Done Shipments Paid Loss
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
3,590
1862 17,771
1863 89,827 59,728 30,099 15,294
1864 168,437 108,130 60,307 37,436
1865 159,059 109,649 49,410 29,248
1866 254,874201,607 53,267 33,459
1867 231,547194,387 37,159 28,018
1868 210,720155,940 54,780 40,930 24,000
1869 292,571215,832 76,739 52,410 27,200 165,225
1870 331,366 261,273 70,092 54,350 32,000 128,348
1871 393,781 297,863 95,918 74,841 32,000 158,477
1872 288,138193,057 95,080 75,094 32,000 70,984
1873 225,331131,111 94,219 77,493 16,000 85,647
1874 156,309 111,823 44,486 23,463 —— —49,472
1875 188,793 137,910 50,884 20,005 — —781
1876 179,330 134,534 44,977 33,613 —— 10,928
1877 158,676 104,109 54,567 36,450 67,875 14,157
1878 173,450 124,153 49,297 20,346 27,150 35,167
1879 243,524 164,867 78,656 40,890 76,925 70,513.
1880 334,866 183,806 151,061 74,504 54,300 78,063
1861 436,036 190,774 245,262 122,872 —— 132,124
1882 495,993 187,173308,811 124,010 36,200 150,526
1883 433,903 162,075271,827 120,230 76,925 136,470
1884 440,698 194,847 245,850 95,565 76,925 163,992
1885 401,001 197,751 203,250 66,949 31,675 78,999
1886 557,195 160,689 396,506 162,400 72,400 124,176
1887 592,246 149,261 442,985 189,305 22,625 139,915
1888 772,439237,386 535,052 243,843 27,150 199,421
1889 881,455 183,530 697,925 298,580 45,250 156,254
1890 960,840 117,176 843,665 312,322 40,725 222,265
1891 881,055 105,182 775,874 247,236 49,775 174,870
1892 892,481 140,598 751,883 259,698 63,350 208,525
1893 836,695 147,696 689,000 239,660 36,200 33,179
1894 701,395 185,455 27,150 103,824
1895 1,029,160 378,942 54,300 221,587
1896 1,098,710 467,997 45,250 174,657
1897 1,270,082 612,216 36,200 501,272
1898 1,541,354 799,885 54,300 421,254
18992,070,859 1,015,093 99,550 522,434
1900 1,963,382 966,341 72,400 492,953
1901 1,961,215 845,374 72,400 526,888
19022,426,404 1,197,145 90,500 502,461
1903 2,540,331 1,166,546 181,000 359,256
1904 2,339,047 1,035,161 181,000 830,022
1905 3,604,377 208,150
Source:Company records.See text for derivation of col. 6.
Note:Details may not add to total because of rounding.
to December 1861.
ITABLE A—2
MEASURESOFOUTPUT OF SELECTED MACHINETOOL COMRANIES, 1861—1910
Total
Output,









































1882 207 96 36,042
1883 213 89 38,521
1884 177 64 44,712
1885 135 62 40,846
1886 331 107 41,416 53,294
1887 374 123 80,552 118,656
1888 457 135 91,811 59,610
1889 568 170 113,177 111,705
1890 574 192 176,708 118,438
1891 500 155 1'9,603 163,778
1892 541 169 161,453 85,764
1893 522 113 86,290 122,584
1894 392 56 58,590 73,329
1895 815 96 116,476 123,382 155,120
1896 1,015 135 121,150 111,349 280,488
1897 1,206 155 177,326 134,159 300,544
1898 1,508 273 499,620 185,906 313,813
1899 1,962 334 396,618 288,561 42,000 290,893
1900 1,666 319 422,631 362,510 84,000 334,663
1901 1,476 314 440,760 242,159 84,000 338,46917,900,000
1902 2,126 362 544,826 330,659 137,000 328,41322,800,000
1903 2,152 358 537,359 320,774 152,000 327,04423,700,000
1904 1,885 167 219,140 169,952 97,000 200,80418,300,000
1905 1,180 383 509,408 294,800 158,000 496,11028,700,000
1906 669 733,908 266,098 139,000 756,52136,400,000
1907 444 719,082 339,776 182,000 546,$7941,300,000
1908 108 185,868 89,044 114,000 309,40816,800,000
1909 278 510,549 168,601 187,000 990,50233,500,000
1910 346 694,337 313,352 240,000 739,42944,300,000
Source:Cols. 1—6 from company records; col.7 from National Machine
Tool Builders Association, Washington, release F—A40a, Feb. 21, 1962.
aThese figures are said by the to include more than 90 per cent
of total industry shipments, to eicclude repair work, and to include parts
shipped with machines. bSbto December 1861.
CAugust to December 1880. dApril to December 1881.TABLE A—3
0O1€ST IC PNb FORE IGN DEBT tNAT ION OF OUTPUT, BROWN SFtARPE BULLARD,
1861—1910
Brown andSharpeShipments Bullard Shipments
Foreignas Foreignas
Domestic ForeignPer CentofDomesticForeignPer Centof
Year (number) Total (number) Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
17 0 0.0
1862 64 0 0.0
1863 53 0 0.0
1864 67 0 0.0
1865 41 4 9.9
1866 43 6 12.2
1867 31 11 26.2
1868 55 8 12.7
1869 67 18 21.2
1870 72 23 24.2
1871 100 24 19.4
1872 87 24 21.6
1873 107 26 19.5
1874 32 12 27.3
1875 28 3 9.7
1876 36 21 36.8
1877 51 12 19.0
1878 22 15 40.5
1879 71 12 14.5
1880 169 15 8.2
1881 208 21 9.2
88b 2b
2.2
1882 174 33 15.9 90 6 6.2
1883 182 31 14.6 89 0 0
1884 152 25 14.1 63 1 1.6
1885 115 20 14.8 62 0 0
1886 200 131 39.6 106 1 0.9
1887 284 90 24.1 113 10 8.1
1888 241 216 47.2 135 0 0
1889 370 198 34.9 168 2 1.2
1890 445 129 22.5 188 4 2.1
1891 396 104 20.7 149 6 3.8
1892 450 91 16.8 168 1 0.6
1893 434 88 16.9 113 0 0
1894 282 110 28.1 56 0 0
1895 638 177 21.7 92 4 4.2
1896 560 455 44.8 100 35 25.9
1897 444 762 63.2 64 91 58.7
1898 719 789 52.3 129 144 52.7
1899 1,205 757 38.6 151 183 54.8
1900 928 738 44.3 143 176 55.2
1901 1,123 353 23.9 216 98 31.2
1902 1,669 457 21.5 330 32 8.8
1903 1,593 559 26.0 283 76 21.2
1904 972 913 48.4 115 52 31.1
1905 307 66 17.7
1906 332 137 29.2
1907 293 152 34.2
1908 82 26 24.1
1909 245 33 11.9
1910 273 73 21.1
Source:Cols. 1, 2, 4, and 5——from company records; col. 3——col. 2 as
per cent of col. 1, Table A—2; col. 6——col. 5 as per cent of col. 2,
Table A—2.
aSeptember to December 1861. bApriito December 1881.518 POWERAND MACHINES
COMMENT ON ROBERTSON AND McDOUGALL
W. Paul Strassman, Michigan State University
It is basic to machine tool technology that almost any object can be
polished off or hammered out in remarkably dissimilar ways. So it is
with these papers. Duncan McDougall insists that a quantitative record
can only be exacted from company accounts and with unflinching con-
sistency limits his observations to the data. Ross Robertson supplements
company accounts with information from trade publications and govern-
ment sources and aims at constructing estimates of the real national
output.
Gratitude is due to Robertson for his useful appraisal of the sources of
information he encountered and the difficulties of interpretation.I
suspect that his estimates of metalworking machinery output for 1900—20
will have a greater durability than those of the machinery made during
that period.I have only one question about his 1900—20 calculations.
Why is the wholesale price index for all commodities better for adjusting
1900—13 prices than the Cincinnati metalworking machinery price index
of George Wing? I would have expected Robertson to splice the American
Appraisal Company's index to Wing's. Cincinnati prices went up three
times as fast as the adjusted wholesale price index during 1900—14, 32 per
cent compared with 10 per cent. But they rose only 21 per cent faster
than the American Appraisal Company's index during 1914—20, or 188
per cent compared with 156 per cent.
The patterns McDougall found in the accounts of Brown and Sharpe
and Bullard suggest once more that what seems plausible with casual
hindsight is not necessarily what happened in history. Of course, once
it is established that light machine tools were not quantitatively important
until after the main push of industrialization, explanations for the lag
come cheaper than September tomatoes, and each of us can provide his
own. Since it is difficult to quarrel with what he documents so well, I
have decided to pick mostly on things I imagine McDougafl might have
added.
But first I wonder if the late, accelerated importance of machine tools
might not be understated by limiting the analysis to "general-purpose
standard machines," as McDougall has.If special-purpose machines
were, developed after standard machines and then spread partly at the
expense of standard machines, their omission means underestimating the
trend. The more specialized users there are, the greater the chance of
developing a special tool for them. Indeed, I was struck by McDougall'sMACHINE TOOL OUTPUT, 1861—1910 519
Table 2 which shows Brown and Sharpe supplying nine industries after
1900 compared with four during the Civil War; and yet the four had
accounted for 95.4 per cent of output compared with 65.4 per cent for
the nine. A quarter of this 65.4 per cent, moreover, consisted of those
diversified clusters, electrical manufacturers and professional and scientific
instruments, which includes watches, cameras, and dental equipment,
hardly a homogeneous outlet.According to the Census of 1905, the
following types of machine tools accounted for only 66.3 per cent of
production: lathes of all types; boring and drilling machines; milling
machines;planers;stamping, flanging, and forging machines;and
punching and shearing machines (Bulletin 67, pp. 9—13).Presumably
some of these and much of the other third were special-purpose machines.
Can one ignore the trend toward specialized machines for making gears,
files, chains, and dozens of other products and components?
On the other hand, it may be that the advantages of copying declined
during these decades, so that omitting copying means comparatively
greater understatement of the earlier years, thus suggesting a higher rate
of growth than the actual one. As the years passed, the machine tool
producers accumulated enough tricks and specialized tool-building tools
to discourage small-scale copying. During the Second World War, in
Latin America and India a few metalworking shops likewise made lathes
and planers for themselves but went back to importing afterward.
Speaking of Latin America, I was struck by Table 3 which shows that
almost 12 per cent of Brown and Sharpe's exports after 1900 went to
Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Were there buyers other than arsenals,
shipyards, and sewing machine factories? From an industry as strategic
as machine tools much can be learned about industrial development in
other sectors. By the same token, much can be learned about machine
tool production from the records of companies making sewing machines,
electric motors, and the like, for example, from their changing inventories
of machinery.I believe that this is one source not yet tapped.It is
obvious how valuable it would be to know the changing durability of
machine tools, and an approximation of the stock available in given
years compared with the annual additions.
Finally, I should like to ask McDougall if anything can be done with
the price per general-purpose lathe or milling machine? Do the accounts
permit an estimate of how prices changed compared with cutting speed
and capacity? If prices are available, perhaps an engineer could estimate
"best-practice production functions" from surviving catalogues and other
specifications.Sources of Productivity Change